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The Illusion of Victory: Access to
Abortion After June Medical Services
Brittany L. Raposa, Esq.*

“This is something central to a woman’s life, to her dignity.
It’s a decision that she must make for herself. And when
government controls that decision for her, she’s being
treated as less than a fully adult human responsible for her
own choices.”1
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
INTRODUCTION

A woman nervously walked into an abortion clinic on July 7,
2020. She took three trains and one bus to get there for a total of
traveling 161 miles. She had her entire savings in her pocket,
wrapped up in an old envelope she found in her kitchen drawer.
Nine hundred and sixteen dollars—the most money she had ever
physically held. She kept one hand in her pocket to keep the money
safe and used the other hand to touch the necklace that lay across
her neck, praying that it was enough. This was the second clinic
she was trying, because the one 72 miles away did not work out, as
she remembers, “I was so uncomfortable. I wasn’t sure if it was
because my skin is black or I was stared at like I was going to

* Associate Director and Professor of Bar Support, Roger Williams
University School of Law.
1. THE SUPREME COURT; Excerpts From Senate Hearing on the
Ginsburg
Nomination,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
22,
1993),
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/22/us/the-supreme-court-excerpts-fromsenate-hearing-on-the-ginsburg-nomination.html
[https://perma.cc/ZPF6UW4H?type=image].
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murder someone, but I had to run out of there and find somewhere
where I felt safe and comfortable.” 2
She was at the clinic for five hours and she was not able to get
an abortion. She received an ultrasound and counseling that
consisted of individuals attempting to convince her to keep the
baby. Although she stated that the conversation was a blur, she
recalled phrases such as “killing,” “selfish,” and “promiscuous.” She
was told to come back in two days after she had the chance to think
about their counseling. Three more trains. One more bus. More
money. More stares of disappointment. More shame. She said she
could only think of one thing months later: “If I have the right to
my own body, why do they make it so hard for me to exercise it?”3
We are currently in a time where women’s reproductive rights,
choice, and equality are under attack. Ignited by the Republican
dominance of state legislatures and the pro-life movement, various
states have begun to enact new and restrictive abortion
regulations.4 This attack is clearly demonstrated by Louisiana’s
enactment of Act 620.5 Indeed, Act 620 was identical to the law
that was struck down three years prior in the Supreme Court case
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, where the Court declared a
Texas law requiring physicians who perform abortion to have
admitting privileges unconstitutional because admitting privileges
are medically unnecessary and impose an undue burden on women
seeking abortion care.6
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s
Health, much legislation was passed in order to undermine abortion
access. Under the Trump administration, attacks on abortion
access have reached their zenith, with anti-abortion activists and
legislators emboldened by a Supreme Court that they believe will
rule in their favor to completely minimize or diminish the right to
2. Telephone Interview with anonymous (Sept. 3, 2020).
3. Id.
4. See Elizabeth Nash, A Surge in Bans on Abortion as Early as Six
Weeks, Before Most People Know They Are Pregnant, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar.
22, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/03/surge-bans-abortionearly-six-weeks-most-people-know-they-are-pregnant
[https://perma.cc/
TM4T-J3J5].
5. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2020); June Med. Servs.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020).
6. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2112; see Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
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access an abortion.7 Attacks on abortion access have further
increased since Justice Kavanagh joined Justice Gorsuch in
molding the lean of the Supreme Court. 8 In 2019, seventeen states
enacted a total of 58 abortion restrictions—twenty-five of which
would ban all or some abortions.9 Comparatively, states passed
twenty-three restrictive laws on abortions in 2018. 10
States continued to enact restrictive abortion regulations, and
the passage of Act 620 led to June Medical Services v. Russo.11 In
June Medical Services, a plurality of the Supreme Court struck
down the Louisiana law that would have thwarted abortion access
to such a degree that it would have left thousands of women in
Louisiana without a practical way of obtaining a safe and legal
abortion.12
The Supreme Court found Act 620’s abortion
restrictions unconstitutional, and pro-choice advocates saw this as
a tremendous victory.13 Although it was a victory in that a woman’s
right to choose was not overturned, it is not the ultimate victory.

7. See Maggie Astor, Abortion Fight Evolves, Overshadowed in 2020 but
With
Huge
Stakes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
11,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/us/politics/abortion-2020-election.html
[perma.cc/6V58-F4UQ].
8. Id.
9. Olivia Cappello, Lizamarie Mohammed, Sophia Naide & Elizabeth
Nash, State Policy Trends 2019: A Wave of Abortion Bans, But Some States Are
Fighting
Back,
GUTTMACHER
INST.
(Dec.
10,
2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/12/state-policy-trends-2019-waveabortion-bans-some-states-are-fighting-back [perma.cc/5JJA-4YHA].
10. Id.
11. Id.; June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2112.
12. See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2111, 2129.
13. E.g., Press Release, Statement: Supreme Court Rules in favor of
Abortion Providers in June Medical Services v. Russo, CTR. FOR REPROD.
RIGHTS (June 29, 2020), https://reproductiverights.org/press-room/statementsupreme-court-rules-favor-abortion-providers-june-medical-services-v-russo
[perma.cc/32ZE-2T9Q]; Press Release, Planned Parenthood Statement on June
Medical v. Russo Victory, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (June 29, 2020),
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-rockymountains/newsroom/planned-parenthood-statement-on-june-medicalserivces-v-russo-victory [perma.cc/P825-7U9V]; Press Release, NARAL
President Ilyse Hogue Comments on Supreme Court Decision in June Medical
Services
v.
Russo,
NARAL
(June
29,
2020),
https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/2020/06/29/naral-pro-choice-americaresponds-scotus-junemedical/ [perma.cc/L2HC-BTRB].
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This Survey will first provide a brief history of abortion
precedent to demonstrate the context in which June Medical
Services was decided. Next, this Survey will break down the June
Medical Services decision, explaining both the plurality opinion and
Chief Justice Roberts’ controlling concurrence. Finally, this Survey
will discuss the implications of the June Medical Services decision,
analyzing how it is not an utmost victory, but is instead an
illustration for the need for abortion reform.
I.

HOW DID WE GET HERE? A BRIEF ABORTION CASE HISTORY

The Constitutional right to an abortion, first recognized in Roe
v. Wade, relies on a substantive due process framework that
emphasizes choice and individual privacy. In Roe, the Supreme
Court held that the substantive due process right to privacy
encompasses a woman’s right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy.14 However, the Court specifically commented that this
right is not absolute, recognizing that states have valid interests in
protecting women’s health and potential human life. 15 The Court
determined that states could regulate abortion for the purpose of
protecting women’s health only after the first trimester. 16 The
Court reasoned that states’ interest in potential human life became
compelling after the point of fetal viability, which ample medical
evidence used in the case suggested could occur as early as twentyfour weeks into a pregnancy.17 Therefore, the Court held that
states could regulate or ban abortion for the purpose of protecting
fetal life during the third trimester, “except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.”18
Following Roe, the Court struck down many abortion
restrictions under the trimester framework. 19 However, pro-life
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
15. Id. at 154, 162.
16. Id. at 163.
17. Id. at 160, 163.
18. Id. at 163–64.
19. For example, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
the Court struck down multiple provisions of an Akron, Ohio ordinance
including provisions requiring that abortions be performed in hospitals after
the first trimester, “informed-consent,” and a mandatory twenty-four-hour
waiting period after signing a consent form. 462 U.S. 416, 422–24, 452 (1983).
In striking down the ordinance, the Court rejected the medical and
psychological claims made in support of the restrictions and noted that “safety
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activists continued their efforts to disseminate the idea that
abortion has negative psychological consequences and began to
manufacture an evidentiary basis for this claim. 20 Then, to pro-life
activists’ content, there was an abrupt shift in the make-up of more
conservative justices at the Supreme Court, calling the future of
Roe v. Wade and its legacy into question.
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Court upheld a
Missouri statute prohibiting abortion and related research in public
facilities, defining the beginning of life at the point of conception,
and requiring physicians to test for fetal viability before performing
an abortion twenty weeks or later into a woman’s pregnancy.21 In
this plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that Roe’s
trimester framework had “proved unsound in principle and
unworkable in practice.”22 To many, this undoubtedly appeared to
be the beginning of overturning Roe.
However, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe’s holding that “the
State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
effective right to elect the procedure.”23 However, Roe’s trimester
framework was replaced with the new “undue burden” standard.24
Under the undue burden standard, states are permitted to pass previability abortion restrictions that promote their recognized
interest in protecting the health of the mother or protecting
potential life, so long as the restrictions do not impose an “undue
burden” on a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.25
However, “a statute which, while furthering [a] valid state interest,
has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of

of second-trimester abortions had increased dramatically” since the Court
decided Roe v. Wade. Id. at 435–36.
20. See Aziza Ahmed, Medical Evidence and Expertise in Abortion
Jurisprudence, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 97–98 (2015).
21. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 501, 522 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 518 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
23. 505 U.S. 833, 845 (1992).
24. Id. at 874.
25. Id. at 877.
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serving its legitimate ends.”26 The Court further reasoned that any
unnecessary health regulations that have a purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion
impose an undue burden on the right to have one.27 Applying this
new standard, the plurality in Casey upheld all but one of the
challenged abortion restrictions—the spousal-notice requirement.28
The plurality held that the requirement was an undue burden
because, where spousal notification is required, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to have an abortion. 29
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court struck down a Nebraska law
banning “partial birth abortions.”30 The Court held that the ban
placed an undue burden on the substantive due process right to
abortion because the statutory language was broad enough to also
encompass the most common method of abortion after the first
trimester. 31 Further, the Court held that the law was
unconstitutional due to its lack of a health exception. 32
In response to this decision, Congress passed a federal “partial
birth abortion” ban, which used more specific language to describe
the banned procedure but still omitted a health exception.33 The
Supreme Court upheld this ban in Gonzales v. Carhart.34 Although
it seemed contrary to their rationale in Stenberg, the Court declined
to invalidate the statute for lacking a health exception on its face,
but left open the possibility of an as-applied challenge.35 The Court
agreed with the purpose that Congress set forth in its legislative
findings, which the Court characterized as “express[ing] respect for

26. Id.
27. Id. at 878.
28. Id. at 879–81, 887, 898–901 (upholding the medical emergency
definition, the informed consent requirement, parental consent requirement
and the record keeping and reporting requirements, and invalidating the
spousal-notification requirement).
29. Id. at 895.
30. 530 U.S. 914, 921–22, 945–46 (2000).
31. Id. at 945–46.
32. Id. at 937.
33. Partial-Birth Abortion Plan Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2019).
34. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007).
35. See id. at 161–67.
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the dignity of human life” and “‘protecting the integrity and ethics
of the medical profession.’”36
Following the decision in Gonzales, there were multiple circuit
splits throughout the country. Courts were applying Casey’s undue
burden standard differently.37 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits,
along with many district courts, applied a balancing test
“‘weigh[ing] the burdens against the state’s justification, [and]
asking whether and to what extent the challenged regulation
actually advances the state’s interests. If a burden significantly
exceeds what is necessary to advance the state’s interests, it is
“undue,”’ which is to say unconstitutional.” 38 When courts applied
this approach, they considered evidence outside of the legislative
record when analyzing the benefits of the regulation and the
anticipated burdens imposed by the regulation.39
Alternatively, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits did not
apply such a balancing test. Instead, when considering a challenge
to abortion restrictions, the courts determined whether the
restrictions satisfied rational-basis review, and then determined
whether the restrictions had the purpose or effect of creating a
substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion.40 Under this
framework, abortion restrictions were upheld as long as they did
not create a substantial obstacle and were rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.41

36. Id. at 157 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731
(1997)).
37. Gillian Metzger, Symposium: Hanging in the Balance, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 6, 2016, 9:23 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/symposiumhanging-in-the-balance/ [perma.cc/752P-M32Q].
38. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 919–20 (7th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905,
913 (9th Cir. 2014)).
39. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786,
790–93 (7th Cir. 2013).
40. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2324 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007)).
In upholding the federal ban on the procedure, the Gonzales majority asserted
that “[w]here [the legislature] has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose
an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain
procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests
in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life,
including life of the unborn.” 550 U.S. at 158.
41. See id.
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Pro-life advocacy groups took advantage of these
inconsistencies and began legislative advocacy with American
United for Life (AUL), continuously focusing on minimizing a
woman’s right to choose.42 The advocacy was centered on creating
burdensome regulations for abortion, entitled Targeted Regulation
of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws, which impose regulations on
abortion providers that are difficult and expensive to comply with.43
These laws typically increase the cost for abortion providers with
the goal of creating widespread clinic closures. 44 Although it is
likely that the purpose of this legislation was to undermine
abortion, the stated purpose was to “safeguard maternal health—
to protect pregnant women from dangerous providers and to ensure
that abortion is performed in safe environments.”45 This prompted
Texas’s passage of H.B. 2 in 2013, which instituted an admitting
privilege requirement for abortion providers.46
Texas’s admitting privileges requirement was first challenged
by abortion clinics and providers in Planned Parenthood of Greater
Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott.47 Although the district
court preliminarily enjoined the admitting privileges requirement,
the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction.48 After the issue was fully
tried, the district court permanently enjoined the admitting
privileges provision because it found that it unduly burdened Texas
women seeking an abortion.49 The Fifth Circuit then reversed the
lower court’s decision and upheld the law as constitutional because
it found that the plaintiffs could not show that abortion
practitioners would be unable to comply with the requirement.50
42. Cary Franklin, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and What It
Means to Protect Women, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 223,
225 (Melissa Murray, Katherine Shaw & Reva B. Siegal eds., 2019).
43. Id. at 226.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 227.
46. Id.
47. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (W.D. Tex. 2013).
48. Id. at 909; Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs.
v. Abbott (Abbott I), 734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013). The plaintiffs also
challenged H.B. 2’s restrictions on medication abortions. Abbott I at 409.
49. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
50. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott
(Abbott II) , 748 F.3d 583, 587, 598 (5th Cir. 2014). The plaintiffs did not file a
petition for certiorari. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292,
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During all of this time, nineteen of abortion clinics had closed: eight
in anticipation of the admitting privileges requirement taking effect
and eleven more on the day that the requirement officially took
effect.51
The Texas requirement was then again challenged, and the
Fifth Circuit again applied the two-step, rational basis/substantial
obstacle analysis, further finding that the restrictions were
constitutional. 52 The restriction was constitutional because it was
“rationally related to a legitimate interest” in raising “the standard
and quality of care for women seeking abortions and . . . protect[ing]
the health and welfare of women seeking abortions.” 53 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt.54
A five-three majority reversed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling,
concluding that the Fifth Circuit’s application of the undue burden
standard was incorrect because courts must “consider the burdens
a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those
laws confer.”55 The Court concluded that the admitting privileges
provision was unconstitutional because evidence in the record
indicated that many abortion doctors could not obtain privileges for
many different reasons and half of Texas’s abortion clinics closed
since the provision went into effect.56 The Court reasoned that
these burdens, “when viewed in light of the virtual absence of any
health benefit, lead us to conclude that the record adequately
supports the district court’s ‘undue burden’ conclusion.” 57
The Whole Woman’s Health majority relied heavily on the
district court’s findings of fact. In comparison, the Casey plurality
gave some deference to the findings of fact by the court of appeals
(not the district court) on its broad construction of the Pennsylvania
abortion statute’s definition of “medical emergency,” as well as
some degree of deference to the district court judge in his

2301 (2016). Some of the plaintiffs, however, joined a separate challenge
brought shortly after this decision was announced. Id.
51. Id. at 2312.
52. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 566, 598 (5th Cir. 2015).
53. Id. at 584.
54. Id., cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2015) (No. 15-274).
55. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
56. See id. at 2312.
57. Id. at 2313.
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determination of the effect of the spousal notification provision.58
However, the plurality did not defer to the lower courts’ factual
findings in making its assessment of the constitutionality of the
informed consent, twenty-four-hour waiting period, or record
keeping provisions.59
In addition, the Whole Woman’s Health majority did not apply
the Gonzales “undue burden plus” standard because it provided no
deference to all the Texas legislature’s factual findings regarding
the benefits to be derived from the admitting privileges
provisions.60 By deferring to the district court’s findings of fact,
rather than the Texas legislature’s, the Court’s application in Whole
Woman’s Health of the undue burden standard took a step away
from rational basis review and back toward Roe’s strict scrutiny,
but without the benefit of clear default rules. 61
The Court stressed that under the applicable constitutional
standards set forth in Casey and Whole Woman’s Health,
“‘[u]necessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion
impose an undue burden on the right’” and are therefore
constitutionally invalid. 62 The Court stressed that this standard
requires courts to independently review the legislative findings
upon which an abortion-related statute rests to weigh the law’s
“asserted benefits against the burdens” it imposes on abortion
access.63 The Texas statute in Whole Woman’s Health required
abortion providers to hold active admitting privileges at a hospital

58. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98
(1992).
59. Id. at 881–87, 900–01. Note that the Casey plurality also referenced
several social science studies and concluded, “[t]his information [social science
studies] and the District Court’s findings reinforce what common sense would
suggest. In well-functioning marriages, spouses discuss important intimate
decisions such as whether to bear a child. But there are millions of women in
this country who are the victims of regular physical and psychological abuse at
the hands of their husbands. Should these women become pregnant, they may
have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of their
decision to obtain an abortion.” Id. at 892–93.
60. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–11
(2016).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 2300 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
63. Id. at 2310 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)).

DOCUMENT6 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/24/2021 2:24 AM

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS

103

within thirty miles of the place where they perform abortions. 64 In
Whole Woman’s Health, the Court found that the statute did not
further the State’s asserted interest in protecting women’s health
and that the conditions on admitting privileges served no “relevant
credentialing function.” 65 The admitting privileges resulted in half
of Texas’s abortion clinics closing and this closure placed a
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. 66
Ultimately, that obstacle, “viewed in light of the virtual absence of
any health benefit,” imposed an undue burden on abortion access
in violation of the Constitution.67
II. WHERE WE ARE: JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES

A. The Louisiana Legislation and its Impact
In June Medical Services, the Court considered the
constitutionality of Louisiana’s Act 620. This Louisiana law
required any doctor who performed abortions to hold “active
admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than
thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or
induced and that provides obstetrical or gynecological health care
services.”68
Further, the statute defined “active admitting
privileges” to mean that the doctor must be “a member in good
standing” of the hospital’s “medical staff . . . with the ability to
admit a patient and to provide diagnostic and surgical services to
such patient.”69 Failure to comply with this statute could have led
to fines of up to four thousand dollars per violation, license
revocation, and civil liability.70 Act 620 was practically identical to
H.B. 2, the law the Court struck down in Whole Woman’s Health.71
Act 620 read as follows: “On the date the abortion is performed or
induced, a physician performing or inducing an abortion shall . . .
64. Id. at 2300 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY ANN. CODE § 171.0031(a)
(2015)).
65. Id. at 2311, 2313.
66. Id. at 2312.
67. Id. at 2313.
68. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2016).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 40:1061.10(A)(1), § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1061.29(C) (2016).
71. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020)
(plurality opinion).
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[h]ave active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not
further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is
performed or induced.”72 H.B. 2, on the other hand, read: “[a]
physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must, on the date
the abortion is performed or induced, have active admitting
privileges at a hospital that: . . . is located not further than 30 miles
from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.”73
A few weeks prior to when Act 620 was to take effect, three
abortion clinics and two abortion healthcare providers filed a
lawsuit, alleging that the law was unconstitutional because it
imposed an undue burden on the right of their patients to obtain an
abortion.74 The plaintiffs immediately requested that the district
court issue a temporary restraining order (TRO), followed by a
preliminary injunction that would prevent the law from taking
effect.75 In return, the State of Louisiana filed a response that
opposed the plaintiff’s TRO request and requested that the Court
hold a hearing on the preliminary injunction as soon as possible. 76
In granting the TRO, the district court allowed the Act to go into
effect but ordered that the plaintiffs not be subject to the Act’s
penalties or sanctions. 77
In June 2015, the district court held a six-day bench trial on
the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.78 Based on all
of the evidence and testimony, the court issued a decision in
January 2016 declaring Act 620 unconstitutional on its face and
preliminarily enjoining its enforcement.79 In response, “[t]he State
immediately asked the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to stay
the District Court’s injunction. The Court of Appeals granted that
stay.”80 However, the Supreme Court issued a stay at the plaintiffs’
request, leaving the district court’s preliminary injunction
temporarily in effect.81 Subsequently, in June 2016, the Supreme
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2016).
73. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY ANN. CODE § 171.0031(a)(1)(A) (2015).
74. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp. 3d 473, 481, 486
(M.D. La. 2016).
75. Id. at 481.
76. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2113–14.
77. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp.3d at 484.
78. Id. at 481.
79. Id. 482–83.
80. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2114.
81. Id.
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Court issued the decision in Whole Woman’s Health, reversing the
Fifth Circuit’s judgment in that case.82
Admitting privileges inhibit abortion access for a variety of
reasons, which were alluded to in Whole Woman’s Health. First, it
is important to note that admitting privileges are extremely
difficult and nearly impossible for abortion providers to secure.83
Many hospitals only grant admitting privileges to physicians who
accept full faculty appointments—a category that abortion
providers do not fall under.84 Second, some hospitals require
physicians to admit a certain number of patients per year before
granting admitting privileges.85 Consequently, because abortion is
an inherently safe procedure, abortion providers are unlikely to
admit a sufficient number of patients, as most women do not need
hospitalization or emergency hospital care after the procedure.86
Third, some hospitals only grant admissions privileges to
physicians who live within a certain radius of the hospital, making
it nearly impossible for abortion providers to obtain any privilege if
they do not live in close proximity to hospitals. 87 Finally, some
hospitals adhere to religious directives that run in conflict with
established medical standards.88 These hospitals, therefore, may
refuse to grant privileges to abortion providers.89
At the time the district court issued a permanent injunction
against Act 620, there were only three clinics in the state that

82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Brief of Pub. Health Deans et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 17, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)
(No. 15-274).
88. See generally CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE, Is Your Health Care
Compromised? How the Catholic Directives Make for Unhealthy Choices (2011),
https://www.catholicsforchoice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/2017_Catholic-Healthcare-Report.pdf
[perma.cc/5C84-LLLX].
89. See Brief of Am. Pub. Health Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 15, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)
(No. 15-274).
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provided abortion services.90 The district court determined that if
the law went into effect, it would reduce the number of open clinics
and physicians to only one, which would make it nearly impossible
for women in Louisiana and women in surrounding states to access
the reproductive health care they need.91
June Medical Services, the abortion provider that brought the
case, claimed that Act 620 violated the constitutional rights of
women in Louisiana because the law imposed significant burdens
on abortion access without providing any benefit to women’s health
or safety. In their petition for certiorari, June Medical Services
averred the following:
In Whole Woman’s Health . . . [the] Court held that a state
law requiring physicians who perform abortions to have
admitting privileges at a local hospital was
unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on
women seeking abortions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld an admitting privileges law in
Louisiana that is identical to the one the court struck
down.92
Therefore, June Medical Services asserted, the issue was
“[w]hether the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding Louisiana’s law
requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting
privileges at a local hospital conflicts with [the] Court’s binding
precedent in Whole Woman’s Health.”93 Louisiana maintained that
Act 620 was constitutional and that Whole Woman’s Health was
distinguishable from the controversy before the Court.94
B.

The District Court’s Findings

The district court found that Louisiana Act 620 does not
advance health or safety or ensure that physicians are competent
to provide abortion care. According to the district court, the
admitting privileges law would have “reduce[d] the number of
90. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 35–36
(M.D. La. 2017).
91. See id. at 80.
92. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo,
140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (No. 18-1323).
93. Id.
94. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 2, June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v.
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (No. 18-1323).
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clinics from three to ‘one, or at most two’ and the number of
physicians providing abortions from five to ‘one, or at most two’ and
‘therefore cripple[d] women’s ability to have an abortion in
Louisiana.”95 Although the state claimed that the law was intended
to ensure that physicians providing abortions had proper
credentials, thereby protecting women’s health, the district court
concluded that the burden on abortion access severely outweighed
the limited benefits that the law achieved.96 Accordingly, the
district court enjoined Louisiana from implementing the admitting
privileges requirement on the ground that it unconstitutionally
imposed an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to an abortion. 97
First, the district court specifically found that the admitting
privileges requirement served no “relevant credentialing
function.”98 Hospitals can, and do, deny admitting privileges for
reasons unrelated to a doctor’s ability to safely perform abortions,
and a requirement that doctors obtain privileges at a hospital
within thirty miles of the place where they perform abortions
simply further constrains physicians for reasons that have nothing
to do with their competence.99 Further, although competency is a
factor in credentialing decisions, hospitals’ primary focus on
credentials has to do with whether a doctor can perform hospitalbased procedures and not outpatient abortions. 100
Second, the district court found that the admitting privileges
requirement “does not conform to prevailing medical standards and
will not improve the safety of abortion in Louisiana.”101 Expert
testimony in the case demonstrated that complications from
surgical abortion are rare and also very rarely require emergency
or hospital treatment, that the current transfer agreement is
suitable for those who do need emergency care, and that the
standard protocol when a patient experiences a complication is to
send her to the nearest hospital, which is not a hospital within

95. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 87–88).
96. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 70, 88–89.
97. Id. at 89–90.
98. Id. at 87 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292, 2313 (2016)).
99. See id. at 50.
100. See id. at 44.
101. Id. at 64.
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thirty miles of the clinic.102 Further, the State introduced
absolutely no evidence that demonstrated patients have better
outcomes when doctors do have admitting privileges within thirty
miles. 103
Therefore, due to the lack of a connection between the
regulation and any notion of safety to women seeking an abortion,
the district court held that the provision was unconstitutional.104
However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding discrepancies in facts
from the district court.105
C.

Troubled Waters: The Fifth Circuit’s Decision

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court’s ruling.106 The Fifth Circuit’s decision in the case
was terrifying for pro-choice advocates and many women, as it
opened the possibility of a radical reorientation of abortion
jurisprudence. The circuit court conceded that it was “bound to
apply [Whole Woman’s Health]” and weigh the benefits of Act 620
against the burdens imposed, but it maintained that the facts of the
case were “remarkably different” from Whole Woman’s Health.107
According to the court, “[u]nlike Texas, Louisiana presents some
evidence of a minimal benefit” and “far more detailed evidence of
Act 620’s impact on access to abortion.”108 The circuit court
reasoned that even though Louisiana’s Act 620 was identical to the
Texas law, it would not impose a substantial burden on abortion
access in Louisiana. 109 The circuit court, based on its own fact
finding, claimed that only one provider at one clinic would be unable
to obtain admitting privileges, contrary to the district court’s
finding that the law would force all but one provider at one clinic to
stop providing abortion care.110 Indeed, the circuit court conducted

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 62, 65.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 87.
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 791, 815.
Id. at 805.
See id.
See id. at 791.
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its own fact finding, which is a task traditionally reserved for the
district courts.111
Subsequently, the plaintiffs requested an emergency stay from
the Supreme Court to prevent the law from going into effect while
they appealed the decision, and the justices granted the stay by a
five-four vote.112 However, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent echoes an
eerie warning for the future of abortion and a woman’s right to
choose. In his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh argued that there is no
possible way of knowing whether Act 620 would impose an undue
burden on abortion access if it was not allowed to go into effect.113
He reasoned that the law’s forty-five-day implementation period
meant that the “question could be readily and quickly answered
without disturbing the status quo or causing harm to the parties or
the affected women.”114 This wait-and-see approach completely
ignores the law’s impact on women being forced to carry a
pregnancy to term while the court waits, as illustrated in the
statements of Louisiana providers and clinics who said that they
would not be able to obtain admitting privileges and therefore
would be forced to stop providing abortion care.115 At least one voice
on the Supreme Court, then, is working to diminish Roe’s promise—
if there is no access to abortion, then there is absolutely no
fundamental right to it.116

111. See id.
112. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663, 663 (2019).
113. Id. at 663–64.
114. Id. at 664.
115. See id.
116. Justice Kavanagh’s 2017 dissent in the D.C. Circuit Court case Garza
v. Hargan further amplifies this voice. See 874 F.3d 735, 752–56 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Garza dealt with a young, pregnant woman
in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR); where ORR denied
the minor’s request for an abortion. Id. at 744 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
Specially, the opinion dealt with the young woman’s petition for rehearing en
banc of an earlier decision where the circuit court directed that ORR be given
eleven days to find a supervisor to take custody of the minor. Id. at 745. In
his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh argued that the ORR should be given more
time to find a sponsor who would take the minor out of custody, which the office
had not successfully done in the preceding months. See id. at 752–55
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). This decision, which was ultimately overturned,
would have further delayed the minor’s ability to secure abortion care. See id.
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D. The Supreme Court Opinion of June Medical Services v. Russo

On review, the Court considered whether the challenged
admitting privileges law was an undue burden on the right to a
woman’s access to abortion.117 The Court applied the constitutional
standards set forth in the earlier abortion cases, focusing on Casey
and Whole Woman’s Health.118 The plurality noted that “a statute
which, while furthering [a] valid state interest has the effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends.”119 The plurality maintained that “[u]nnecessary health
regulations impose an unconstitutional undue burden if they have
the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a
woman seeking an abortion.”120
In determining whether a
challenged abortion restriction constitutes a substantial obstacle,
“courts must consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access
together with the benefits those laws confer.”121 This inquiry
requires courts to review legislative fact finding “under a
deferential standard,” but deference does not mean an abdication of
the judicial role.122 Importantly, the plurality cautioned, “the
courts ‘retai[n] an independent constitutional duty to review factual
findings where constitutional rights are at stake.’”123
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court concluded that by
presenting direct testimony from doctors who had been unable to
secure privileges, and “plausible inferences to be drawn from the
timing of the clinic closures” around the law’s effective date, the
plaintiffs satisfied their burden to establish that the Texas
admitting-privileges requirement caused the closure of the
117. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112–13 (2019)
(plurality opinion). The Court also considered whether the abortion providers,
as opposed to patients, had standing to challenge the Louisiana law. Id. at
2117. On that point, the plurality concluded that Louisiana had waived the
standing argument and that “a long line of well-established precedents
foreclose[d] [this] belated challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing.” Id. at 2120.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2120 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292, 2309 (2016)).
120. Id. (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309) (internal
quotations omitted).
121. Id. (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2324).
122. See id. (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310).
123. Id. at 2120 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310).
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clinics.124 These inferences were further supported by submissions
of amici in the medical profession.125
In view of Whole Woman’s Health, Justice Breyer carefully
weighed the purported benefits of Act 620 against the burdens that
its enforcement would entail, concluding that the district court’s
determination that Act 620 “would place substantial obstacles in
the path of women seeking an abortion in Louisiana” was
justified. 126 Further, Justice Breyer concluded that the obstacle
was high because it provided no significant health benefits.127
The key findings the Court relied on are as follows: The district
court supervised four doctors involved in June Medical Services for
over a year and a half and those doctors were unable to obtain
conforming admitting privileges from thirteen hospitals. 128 In
addition, some of the doctors’ applications were denied for reasons
that had nothing to do with their ability to perform abortions
safely.129 The cost of the applications was also high, and doctors in
good faith then could not apply to every qualifying hospital,
especially given the high risks of being denied.130 Further, the fact
that hospital admissions for abortion are incredibly rare meant
that, unless the hospitals also maintain active obstetrical practices,
“abortion providers in Louisiana [were] unlikely to have any recent
in-hospital experience.”131 Despite this fact, hospital experience
was a precondition for many of the hospitals. 132
The evidence presented in the district court also demonstrated
that many providers, even if they could initially obtain admitting
privileges, would not be able to keep them because, unless they
have a practice that requires regular in-hospital care, they will lose
the privileges for failing to use them.133 Due to the safety of

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313 (2016).
See id. at 2312.
See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 2132.
Id. at 2122.
Id.
Id. at 2122–23.
Id. at 2123.
Id.
Id.
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abortion practices, it would be extremely difficult for any doctor to
maintain admitting privileges.134
Interestingly, the Court further relied on evidence that
demonstrated that opposition to abortion played a significant role
in some hospitals’ decisions to deny doctors’ admitting privileges.135
Some hospitals prohibited a doctor with admitting privileges from
performing abortions, and others were unwilling to extend
privileges to abortion providers in their discretion. 136 In addition,
although abortion is legal, many abortion providers faced
tremendous hostility in Louisiana, which, in turn, prevented them
from obtaining the necessary admitting privileges. 137 Many
Louisiana hospitals required applicants to identify an alternative
doctor who could serve as a backup should the doctor become
unavailable, and opposition to abortion can prevent that physician
from getting the required backup.138
The Court stressed how the district court found that the law
did not help to cure any “significant health-related problem.”139 The
district court further found that the admitting privileges
requirement did not protect women’s health and provided no
significant health benefits, and made no improvement to women’s
health compared to any prior law.140 The Supreme Court found that
these findings were not clearly erroneous.141
It is important to note that Louisiana has other TRAP laws in
place apart from the admitting privileges provision, many of which
impose barriers on patients and providers. For example, Louisiana
has laws banning abortion at or after twenty weeks postfertilization (twenty-two weeks after the last menstrual period),
and banning the procedure used for abortions later in pregnancy,
known as dilation and extraction.142 There are also laws that
mandate a twenty-four-hour waiting period and requirements to
receive an ultrasound and biased counseling, laws requiring
134. See id. at 2123.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2124.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2130 (quoting June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp.
3d 27, 86 (M.D. La. 2017)).
140. Id. at 2131.
141. Id.
142. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.1.2; id. § 1061.1.1; id. § 1061.28.
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parental involvement for minors, laws restricting public insurance
coverage in line with the Hyde Amendment,143 and laws banning
private insurance coverage for abortion care for plans in the state
health exchange.144 Although the admitting privileges law was
struck down, states like Louisiana are continuously implementing
legislation that impose significant restrictions on women obtaining
abortions. 145
E.

The Irony: Chief Justice Roberts’ Concurrence

Chief Justice Roberts began by noting his views on abortion
rights, and stated that he “joined the dissent in Whole Woman’s
Health and continues to believe that the case was wrongly
decided.”146 However, he then explained that “[t]he legal doctrine
of stare decisis requires [the Court], absent special circumstances,
to treat the cases alike.”147 Chief Justice Roberts makes a powerful
statement in his concurrence when he states that no one asked the
Court “to reassess the constitutional validity” of Casey’s undue
burden standard.148 Chief Justice Roberts applied Casey’s undue
burden standard in June Medical Services, strengthening Casey’s
force in the area of abortion regulation. 149 Because the Louisiana
law imposed “as severe” a burden on abortion access as did the
Texas law invalidated in Whole Woman’s Health, the Chief Justice
concluded that it “cannot stand under our precedents.”150
According to Chief Justice Roberts, although the majority in
Whole Woman’s Health “faithfully recit[ed]” Casey’s substantial
obstacle standard, 151 the decision to invalidate the Texas admitting
privileges law also went beyond Casey to “require[ ] that courts
143. The Hyde Amendment bars the use of federal funding of abortion
except to either (1) save the life of the woman, or (2) if the pregnancy was the
result of rape or incest.
144. Id. § 1061.17(B)(6); see id. § 1061.16; id. § 1061.10(D); id. § 1061.14(A);
id. § 1061.6; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1014(B).
145. See
Louisiana,
CTR.
FOR
REPROD.
RIGHTS,
https://reproductiverights.org/state/louisiana#footnote3_92fi3n4
[perma.cc/JXJ8-947F] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
146. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2134.
148. See id. at 2135.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 2134, 2139.
151. Id. at 2135.
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consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together
with the benefits those laws confer.”152 However, Chief Justice
Roberts stresses that Casey did not suggest “that a weighing of costs
and benefits of abortion regulation was a job for the courts.”153 He
explained that if Casey required any consideration of the benefits of
an abortion regulation, it was only in establishing “the threshold
requirement that the State have a ‘legitimate purpose’ and that the
law be ‘reasonably related to that goal.’”154
Therefore, Whole Woman’s Health was precedent only to the
extent that it reiterated Casey’s substantial obstacle standard.155
On the contrary, the Court’s directive to reviewing courts to weigh
the benefits of an abortion regulation against its burdens was, in
Chief Justice Roberts’ view, an inaccurate portrayal of Casey’s
holding and rationale.156 Therefore, if stare decisis dictated the
outcome in June Medical Services, the precedent to be followed was
not the full decision in Whole Woman’s Health, as the plurality
maintained, but instead only those aspects of Whole Woman’s
Health that reiterated the more specific and limited standard
identified in Casey.157
In addition, Chief Justice Roberts discussed how the Casey
plurality considered only “whether there was a substantial burden,
not whether benefits outweighed burdens,”158 including in its
consideration of a twenty-four-hour waiting period that the lower
court found “did not further the state interest in maternal
health.”159 Consequently, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the
premise of “Casey is clear: The several restrictions that did not
impose a substantial obstacle were constitutional, while the

152. Id. (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292,
2309 (2016)).
153. Id. at 2136.
154. Id. at 2138 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 882 (1992)).
155. See id. at 2139 (noting that Casey’s “substantial obstacle” test was a
sufficient basis for the decision in Whole Woman’s Health).
156. See id. at 2136; see also id. at 2139 (“In neither [June Medical Services
nor Whole Woman’s Health], nor in Casey itself, was there call for consideration
of a regulation’s benefits, and nothing in Casey commands such
consideration.”).
157. See id. at 2139.
158. Id. at 2137 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 822).
159. Id. at 2136 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 886).
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restriction that did impose a substantial obstacle was
unconstitutional.”160
Once he established the correct application of Casey, Chief
Justice Roberts then turned to apply Casey to Act 620, determining
whether it was an unconstitutional substantial obstacle.161
Focusing on the district court’s findings that “the Louisiana law
would ‘result in a drastic reduction in the number and geographic
distribution of abortion providers’” and “longer waiting times for
appointments, increased crowding and increased associated health
risk,”162 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the challenged law
was an unconstitutional substantial obstacle in a woman’s way to
an abortion.163
Although Chief Justice relied on stare decisis to write his
concurring opinion, he denounced the opinion of Whole Woman’s
Health as it departed from Casey. Chief Justice Roberts, then,
followed binding precedent that he favored and abandoned
precedent he did not. In fact, the dissenting justices, Justice Alito
and Justice Gorsuch, argued that Chief Justice Roberts’s
characterization of Whole Woman’s Health was incorrect—a
remade ruling inconsistent with the actual holding of the case.164
Further, dissenting Justice Kavanagh observed that “five Members
of the Court reject the Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit
standard.”165 Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts created the illusion
of preserving precedent and instead created a precedent that
agreed with the plurality, but upheld principles of the dissent and
the conservative wing of the Supreme Court.
III. WHERE WE ARE HEADED: ABORTION ACCESS AND THE UNDUE
BURDEN STANDARD

Although June Medical Services v. Russo was a very slight
victory, there is still a lot of work to do in the area of reproductive
equality. June Medical Services is seen as keeping access to
160. Id. at 2138.
161. See id. at 2139.
162. Id. at 2140 (quoting June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp.
3d 27, 81, 87 (M.D. La. 2017)).
163. Id. at 2142.
164. See id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2180–81 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
165. Id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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abortion open, but two questions remain: (1) whether the opinion
set the stage for stricter abortion regulations, and (2) whether the
opinion truly kept access to abortion open. In short, June Medical
Services definitely opened the possibility of stricter and potentially
terrifying future abortion regulations. Further, although June
Medical Services did not completely close access to abortion, it did
not create access for many women, either.
A.

The Curse of the Concurrence

Although this case was seen as opening access to abortion,
Chief Justice Roberts clarified that his concurrence only covers
Louisiana’s admitting privileges law by endorsing Justice Samuel
Alito’s dissenting opinion that “the validity of admitting privileges
laws ‘depend[s] on numerous factors that differ from State to
State.’”166 Rather than directly holding that admitting privileges
are unconstitutional and are designed to shut down abortion clinics,
Chief Justice Roberts will likely have the opposite impact. Now
anti-abortion politicians and advocates can strategically deploy
admitting privileges laws. There will undoubtedly be more laws
and more challenges, but with the current makeup of the Supreme
Court with the addition of Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the
challenges now have a good chance at failing.
In addition, Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion spent a
great deal of time undermining Whole Woman’s Health. As
explained above, Chief Justice Roberts now wants to return to what
he says is the correct analysis of the undue burden standard from
Casey. In his view, when considering an abortion restriction, courts
should not balance burdens against benefits, but should instead
only consider whether the law imposes a substantial obstacle in the
path of a person seeking an abortion, and whether the restriction
simply survives rational basis review.167 It is only if there is a
substantial obstacle, or if the law somehow fails rational basis
review, that then it will be invalidated.168 The issue lies in the fact
that Chief Justice Roberts’ scope of what is a “substantial obstacle”
is quite literally limited. In Gonzales v. Carhart, he did not consider
a nationwide ban on an abortion procedure with no exception for
166. Id. at 2141 n.6 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2157 (Alito,
J., dissenting)).
167. Id. at 2136, 2139.
168. Id. at 2139.
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women’s health to be a substantial obstacle.169 Further, in Whole
Woman’s Health, he did not believe the Texas law presented a
substantial obstacle, despite half of the state’s abortion clinics
closing as a result of the law.170
Whole Woman’s Health served as a large point of clarification
on abortion. As lower courts were applying Casey’s standard
differently, Whole Woman’s Health finally gave much needed
clarity, only to have Chief Justice Roberts return us to the land of
confusion. This will likely increase abortion litigation where there
is a high chance of unconstitutional abortion provisions being
upheld due to the lower federal courts being filled with judges
appointed by the Trump administration.171
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts invited the possibility of
overturning Roe and Casey when he specifically proclaimed that
“[n]either party has asked [the Court] to reassess the constitutional
validity of [the undue burden] standard.”172 Chief Justice Roberts
makes clear that he only struck down the provision because he must
follow the rule of law.173 Now, he is inviting a challenge to the
undue burden standard. In time, it raises the question of whether
abortion will be outlawed all together.
B.

The Continued Existence of Reproductive Health Care Disparities

Both before and after June Medical Services, severe disparities
in reproductive health care and abortion exist. Approximately
twenty-seven cities in the United States are called “abortion
deserts,” these are cities in which people have to travel at least one-

169. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 130, 132–33 (2007) (Chief
Justice Roberts joined the majority, which upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003).
170. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2330, 2346–
2350 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Alito’s
dissenting opinion, which argued that the Texas admitting privileges law did
not create a substantial burden).
171. See John Gramlich, How Trump compares with other recent presidents
in appointing federal judges, PEW RES. CTR. (July 15, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/15/how-trump-compareswith-other-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/
[https://perma.cc/Z7D5-Z76Z].
172. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J., concurring
opinion).
173. See id. at 2133–42.
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hundred miles to reach an abortion provider.174 Further, more than
eleven million women of reproductive age nationwide live more
than an hour’s drive from an abortion provider.175 In addition, as
of 2017, eighty-nine percent of counties in the United States have
no known clinics that offer abortion care.176
Women living in states with TRAP laws typically have less
labor mobility—the ability to transition between jobs or from
unemployment to employment—and women living in states with
better access to reproductive health care, including abortion access,
have higher earnings.177 Unfortunately, women who are denied an
abortion face serious consequences, including the greater likelihood
of living in poverty, staying in abusive relationships, and
experiencing mental health issues, as well as increased chances of
suffering health complications from continuing a pregnancy.178
People of color who need access to abortion care, particularly
black women, will experience the most harm with new and existing
abortion restrictions. Individuals of color disproportionately live in
states affected by restrictive abortion bans and face discrimination
and bias in the health care system that affects their ability to access
quality care.179 Such bias and negative treatment contributes to
174. Novel study identifies 27 large U.S. cities as “abortion deserts”,
ADVANCING
NEW
STANDARDS
IN
REPROD.
HEALTH,
https://www.ansirh.org/news/novel-study-identifies-27-large-us-cities%E2%80%9Cabortion-deserts%E2%80%9D
[perma.cc/9VZU-RD8Q]
(last
visited Jan. 17, 2021).
175. K.K. Rebecca Lai & Jugal K. Patel, For Millions of American Women,
Abortion Access Is Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/05/31/us/abortion-clinics-map.html
[https://perma.cc/D5KG-GQ9F].
176. Rachel K. Jones, Elizabeth Witwer & Jenna Jerman, Abortion
Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2017, GUTTMACHER
INST. (Sept. 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/report/abortion-incidenceservice-availability-us-2017# [https://perma.cc/2ZBL-Q7Q3].
177. Kate Bahn, Adriana Kugler, Melissa Mahoney, Danielle Corley &
Annie McGraw, Linking Reproductive Health Care Access to Labor Market
Opportunities for Women, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 21, 2017, 9:01 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2017/11/21/442653/li
nking-reproductive-health-care-access-labor-market-opportunities-women/
[https://perma.cc/693R-26WE].
178. Turnaway Study, ADVANCING NEW STANDARDS IN REPROD. HEALTH,
https://www.ansirh.org/research/turnaway-study
[https://perma.cc/LPF7RB8Z] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
179. Jamila Taylor, Women of Color Will Lose the Most if Roe v. Wade is
Overturned, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 23, 2018, 9:01 AM),
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poor health outcomes.180 For example, Black women in the United
States are three to four times more likely than non-Hispanic white
women to die from pregnancy-related causes.181 In addition to
abortion disparities, women of color also face disparities across
sexual and reproductive health outcomes, including maternal
health, cervical and breast cancers, and sexually transmitted
infections (STIs).182 Abortion restrictions will only further subject
individuals to pregnancy-related health risks.
In addition, abortion restrictions have a different impact on low
income individuals. In 2011, the rate of unintended pregnancy for
women aged fifteen to forty-four was more than five times higher
for women with incomes below the federal poverty level than it was
for those with incomes at or above two-hundred percent of the
poverty level.183 Women with low incomes are far more likely to
have to drive farther distances to reach an abortion provider.184
Financial factors, such as transportation, travel costs, the ability to
take time off of work, child care costs, and the cost of the procedure
itself creates impossible barriers to abortion care for low-income
individuals.185
Further, disparities are wide for transgender, non-binary, and
gender-non-confirming individuals. These individuals face unique
barriers to accessing care, such as discrimination, bias, and lack of
provider knowledge about these groups’ health care needs.186 Such
https://www.americanprogress.org/isues/women/news/2018/08/23/
455025/women-color-will-lose-roe-v-wade-overturned/ [perma.cc/V826-4HW9].
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184. See Dan Keating, Time Meko & Danielle Rindler, Abortion access is
more difficult for women in poverty, WASHINGTON POST (July 10, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2019/07/10/abortion-access-ismore-difficult-women-poverty/?arc404=true [perma.cc/CB6A-Y8Q8].
185. See Boonstra, supra note 183, at 46–47.
186. See Ruth Dawsom & Tracy Leong, Not Up For Debate: LQBTQ People
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(Nov.
16,
2020),
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mistreatment and poor quality of care create a fear and distrust of
the reproductive health care system.187 The U.S. Transgender
Survey found that twenty-three percent of respondents avoided
going to the doctor out of fear of being mistreated. 188 These groups
already did not have a safe option for accessing abortion, and it may
only be made worse by future restrictions to abortion access in these
communities.
Finally, many other groups face additional barriers to access,
including immigrants, children, and disabled individuals. All of
these groups face discrimination, bias, and heightened scrutiny
when it comes to reproductive health care in the United States. 189
However, as the other disparities discussed in this Survey, these
disparities were neither addressed nor given any hope for the future
in the Supreme Court June Medical Services opinion.
The Supreme Court and legislators must focus on the impact
regulations would have on groups whose access to abortion is
especially vulnerable. These groups consist of many women
geographically located in the Midwest and the South, people of
color, low-income people, people with disabilities, young people, and
transgender and non-binary people. As policymakers examine
barriers to abortion access for marginalized groups, it is important
to remember that many people identify with a multiple of these
groups, which further amplifies the disparities and barriers they
face in receiving abortion and reproductive healthcare.
According to Casey, where we are strictly brought back to after
the decision in June Medical Services, abortion regulations that
have either “the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus”
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violate the Constitution and its protection of women’s abortion
rights.190 The focus, then, is whether the restriction places an
“undue burden” on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.191
However, if the Court does not analyze the undue burden standard
from the perspective of the most marginalized individuals in
society, then there will never truly be proper access to abortion.
June Medical Services did not address these issues of disparities,
nor did it make them any more equal. In fact, if it did anything, it
opened the opportunity to create further disparities for individuals
accessing abortion care.
CONCLUSION

Where we are headed from here is both uncertain and
unsettling. The fight for reproductive rights and justice must
continue stronger than ever. Voices on the Supreme Court have
undoubtedly demonstrated a blatant disregard for precedent in
order to further the attack on abortion rights. Although the most
extreme abortion restrictions have been blocked by the courts,
many restrictive laws remain in effect across the country.192 The
restrictive abortion bans currently in effect include bans on
abortion at varying weeks of gestation, on certain methods of
abortion procedures, or on abortions for particular reasons, such as
fetal diagnosis. 193 Further, there are restrictions in place such as
mandatory waiting periods and ultrasounds, mandated counseling
with biased and inaccurate information, parental involvement
requirements for minors, and more.194 A recent study and analysis
from the Center for Reproductive Rights found that if Roe v. Wade
were significantly limited or overturned, abortion could potentially
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become illegal in as many as twenty-four states. 195 This analysis,
in part, also found that many of these states are among the twentyfour states that have TRAP laws in place, including regulations for
facility structure and licensing, as well as requirements for abortion
providers. The restrictions and disparities continue.
Unfortunately, the future of reproductive rights and
reproductive justice is in jeopardy. The Supreme Court must
recognize and support both the right to abortion and access to
abortion—which are not synonymous. A decision that takes into
account those who are most affected by abortion restrictions is
absolutely necessary. However, there is one thing that is certain:
women cannot have a right to their own bodies if it is too difficult
to exercise that right.
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